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Abstract Assessing individuals’ time and risk preferences is crucial in domains
such as health-related decisions (e.g., dieting, addictions), environmentally-friendly
practices, and saving opportunities. We propose a new method to jointly elicit and
estimate risk attitudes and intertemporal choices. We use a novel individual level
estimation procedure based on a hierarchical Bayes methodology, which can inte-
grate different functional forms for discounting and risk attitudes. This method
provides individual level estimates, and allows us to explore the heterogeneity in
the data. In addition, we report a negative correlation between risk and time prefer-
ences, implying that risk-seeking individuals are less patient and less willing to defer
consumption.
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1 Introduction
When making decisions in an intertemporal setting, individuals are known to heav-
ily discount future outcomes and to have a strong preference for immediate gains
(Loewenstein and Prelec 1992; Frederick et al. 2002). Understanding individuals’
intertemporal decisions and designing tools to improve their decision making process
has been a major research concern, with individual welfare and public policy impli-
cations. Are people myopic about health decisions such as following better diets,
quitting smoking, or exercising? Do public policy makers respond appropriately to
the threat of global warming, a decision involving a tradeoff between short term
expenses and long run rewards? Chesson and Viscusi (2003) analyze the joint influ-
ence of time and uncertainty and conclude that people may have difficulties choosing
the optimal precautionary measures to prevent climate change, a long term hazard,
due to both ambiguity in the probability of global warming phenomena and also due
to the ambiguity in the timing of global warming consequences. This suggests that
a joint model of risk and time preferences is necessary to assess decision makers’
tradeoffs between outcomes at different points in time.
The current study proposes a methodology that jointly elicits and estimates risk
and time preferences at the individual level. We elicit risk attitudes and intertemporal
choices following Holt and Laury’s (2002) risk aversion experimental procedure and
Coller and Williams’s (1999) time discounting methodology involving price lists. We
embed a constant relative risk aversion specification in an exponential discounting
model, following Andersen et al. (2008). Our main contribution is methodological.
We add a layer of flexibility to the estimation method through a hierarchical Bayes
methodology, which allows us to recover individual level estimates and assess the het-
erogeneity in intertemporal choices and risk attitudes. Hierarchical Bayes modeling
is a validated alternative to maximum likelihood estimation (Rossi et al. 2005; Toubia
et al. 2013). The flexibility of the method in dealing with highly non-linear model
specifications represents an important benefit. Such individual level estimates can be
used in simulation studies to assess the effectiveness of changes in public policy deci-
sions. To our knowledge, this is the first study that uses hierarchical Bayes modeling
to jointly estimate risk and time preferences and to analyze the heterogeneity in the
data.
Our results suggest that individuals are generally risk-averse, with a mean constant
relative risk aversion coefficient of 0.515; their discount rates are in line with previous
findings on joint elicitation (mean discount rate of 12%). The methodology is general
and can be adapted to different functional forms. To test the robustness of our results,
we estimate time preferences by using an exponential model, a hyperbolic model
proposed by Mazur (1987), another hyperbolic specification by Prelec (2004), and a
mixture model that allows a part of the population to behave as exponential discoun-
ters, and the remaining part as hyperbolic discounters. Our study provides evidence
that controlling for the curvature of the risk aversion leads to lower estimated dis-
count rates in experiments with hypothetical stakes. We conduct a clustering study
and find three types of decision makers based on their risk and time preferences:
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a high patience type (risk-averse, low discounting), a moderate patience type (with
average risk and time preferences), and a low patience cluster (risk-seeking, high
discounting). This result suggests that regulators could design policy interventions
specifically aimed at people with various degrees of patience. The increased reliabil-
ity of our estimates also allows us to revisit the issue of the correlation between risk
and time preferences. We find evidence that risk-seeking people are more impatient
and require higher interest rates to postpone consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present a brief literature review on joint elicitation and estimation of risk and time
preferences. The experimental procedure for the joint elicitation of risk and time pref-
erences is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce our empirical model
and present the estimation methodology involving a hierarchical Bayes approach. In
Section 5, we report the results from our Bayesian estimation and further investigate
the heterogeneity of risk and time preferences via individual differences and clusters
of decision makers. The paper concludes with a discussion and the implications of
our findings.
2 Existing literature
Recent developments in the intertemporal choice literature include a joint elicitation
of risk and time preferences (Andersen et al. 2008; Laury et al. 2012; Andreoni and
Sprenger 2012a; Toubia et al. 2013). This stream of literature emerged based on the
conjecture that eliciting time preferences while assuming risk neutrality leads to an
overestimation of discount rates. Using multiple price lists, Andersen et al. (2008)
jointly elicit subjects’ risk attitudes and intertemporal choices and show that dis-
count rates are significantly lower than those reported in previous studies and more in
line with market rates (10.1% on average). In another study, Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012a) ask subjects to allocate a convex budget over a specific time period and find
an average implied discount rate of 30% per year. They also observe that time prefer-
ences are generally dynamically consistent. Using a binary lottery mechanism, Laury
et al. (2012) propose an elicitation of discount rates that corrects for the non-linearity,
and is invariant to the form of the utility function. Their elicitation method yields
similar results to the joint elicitation of time and risk preferences in Andersen et al.
(2008), with an average discount rate of 12.2% per year. These results show that it is
crucial to consider individuals’ risk attitudes when eliciting time preferences in order
to prevent an overestimation of discount rates.
The studies mentioned above as well as some other experimental findings
(Kimball et al. 2009; von Gaudecker et al. 2011; Cardenas and Carpenter 2013) report
significant heterogeneity in risk attitudes and intertemporal choices. Andersen et al.
(2008) analyze the heterogeneity caused by observable individual characteristics as
well as unobservable characteristics and find evidence for unobserved heterogene-
ity. Meyer (2013) reports substantive heterogeneity in time preferences for public
goods, heterogeneity that cannot be explained by observable personal characteristics.
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However, Chesson and Viscusi (2000) show that several individual difference
variables impact time discounting. Nonsmokers and people with a post-graduate edu-
cation degree have higher discount rates than smokers and subjects without advanced
education. This highlights the challenge of designing a model of decision making
under risk and time that can accommodate individual level behavior.
Several studies in behavioral decision making analyze the heterogeneity in the
data and propose individual level parameter estimates. For instance, Jarnebrant et al.
(2009) and Nilsson et al. (2011) estimate prospect theory parameters using hierar-
chical Bayes methods. A recent study by Toubia et al. (2013) focuses on building a
dynamic (adaptive) survey design similar to conjoint studies, which presents decision
makers with a personalized set of choices to elicit their risk and time preferences.
They estimate cumulative prospect theory parameters as well as a quasi-hyperbolic
time discounting model via a hierarchical Bayes procedure. They capture the hetero-
geneity in parameter values and use it for estimation and for designing the adaptive
questionnaires.
Although essential for building theoretical and empirical models in decision mak-
ing, as well as for public policy, the correlation between risk aversion and discount
rate has received relatively little attention. Experimental studies on risk and time
preferences have traditionally focused on one of the two phenomena apart from few
exceptions. Andersen et al. (2008) report a small but significant positive correla-
tion between subjects’ attitudes toward risk and time, such that the level of discount
rates increases with their risk aversion. Their findings are supported by evidence in
Anderhub et al. (2001). Anderson and Stafford (2009) find that individuals become
less patient as risk increases. Abdellaoui et al. (2013) report a small negative corre-
lation between risk aversion and impatience for gains, in one of the two experiments
they conducted. In a second experiment, they find no relation between risk aversion
and impatience. Moreover, as utility over time and utility under risk are different,
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) suggest using two utility functions, a risk function to trans-
form risky prospects into certainty equivalents, and a time discounting function to
recover the present value of the certainty equivalent. These contradictory results sug-
gest that further assessment of the correlation between risk and time preferences is
necessary.
3 Experimental design
We elicit risk and time preferences using the joint elicitation method proposed by
Andersen et al. (2008).1 The reason for choosing this methodology is twofold. First,
we are interested in implied discount rates and our goal is to eliminate confounds
introduced by the utility curvature that lead to upwards bias when estimating time
1The experimental procedure can be found in the Online Appendix, and is thoroughly documented in
Andersen et al. (2008).
J Risk Uncertain (2016) 53:1–28 5
preferences. Second, the methodology is more pliable to our hierarchical Bayes spec-
ification, allowing us to obtain reliable individual level estimates of risk and time
preferences.
We recruited subjects by sending an invitation email to MBA and M.Sc. students
from a large French business school. Students were invited to attend the experiment
during their lunch break, and were offered multiple time slots. While student samples
are prevalent in decision making research, the literature raises issues related to the
generalizability of the results to the overall population. Our subjects are enrolled in a
business school and 96.5% of them have taken at least one finance related course prior
to participating in the experiment. Thus, they seem to be more financially educated
than the average population. Falk et al. (2013) study the behavior of student samples
versus a representative sample of the general population and conclude that there is no
concern for self-selection bias among students, and students’ behavior does not seem
to be significantly different than that of the general population. Our experimental
results are in line with Laury et al. (2012), who employ an undergraduate student
sample from a large US university. Andersen et al. (2008) use a representative sample
of the adult Danish population and report an average discount rate lower than in our
experiment. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) report a higher discount rate than all the
above cited studies, with an undergraduate freshman and sophomore sample.
A total of 87 students participated in the experiment, in exchange for course credit.
Subjects were informed that once the experiment is over, a lottery would be held, and
5 winners would receive a e20 gift voucher for a large media retailer. Subjects were
not informed of the likely number of participants in the experiment, and were there-
fore not able to compute their chances of winning the lottery. The experiment began
with the experimenter reading the instructions aloud. Participants were asked to turn
to their computer screens and complete two tasks, the discount rate task and the risk
aversion task. Subjects did four risk aversion tasks and four time discounting tasks,
and completed a questionnaire about their age, gender, major, and their grade in the
introductory finance course, if they had attended one. After completing the experi-
mental task, subjects were debriefed and told that they would be informed about the
results of the lottery within a month. Each experimental session took about 30 min-
utes. We conducted 21 experimental sessions, with about five subjects per session, to
ensure sufficient attention from the experimenter to read the instructions and provide
answers to questions.
3.1 Identifying risk preferences
The experimental procedure used to identify subjects’ risk preferences is based on
the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion experiment. Each subject is presented with a
choice between two lotteries A and B. Table 1 shows the payoff matrix presented to
the subjects. In the first decision line, lottery A offers a 10% chance of wining e200
and a 90% chance or winning e160. The respondents did not see the expected values
of the lotteries or the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) intervals. In Table 1, we
can see that the expected values of lottery B increase relative to the expected values
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Table 1 Typical payoff matrix in the risk aversion experiment. Subjects were asked to complete four risk
aversion tasks with different payoffs, in the same income range
Open CRRA interval
Lottery A Lottery B EV(A) EV(B) Difference if subject switches
p e p e p e p e e e in e to lottery B
0.1 200 0.9 160 0.1 385 0.9 10 164 47.5 116.5 −∞ −1.71
0.2 200 0.8 160 0.2 385 0.8 10 168 85 83 −1.71 −0.95
0.3 200 0.7 160 0.3 385 0.7 10 172 122.5 49.5 −0.95 −0.49
0.4 200 0.6 160 0.4 385 0.6 10 176 160 16 −0.49 −0.15
0.5 200 0.5 160 0.5 385 0.5 10 180 197.5 −17.5 −0.15 0.14
0.6 200 0.4 160 0.6 385 0.4 10 184 235 −51 0.14 0.41
0.7 200 0.3 160 0.7 385 0.3 10 188 272.5 −84.5 0.41 0.68
0.8 200 0.2 160 0.8 385 0.2 10 192 310 −118 0.68 0.97
0.9 200 0.1 160 0.9 385 0.1 10 196 347.5 −151.5 0.97 1.37
1 200 0 160 1 385 0 10 200 385 −185 1.37 ∞
of lottery A, as one goes down the table. If a subject is indifferent between the two
options, she can specify her indifference by choosing option I. The logic behind the
risk aversion task implies that only very risk-seeking individuals will choose lottery
B in the first row and only very risk adverse individuals will choose lottery A in the
row before last. Risk neutral subjects are expected to switch to lottery B at decision
row 5. The last row is a consistency check, as all subjects are bound to prefer lottery
B, which strictly dominates lottery A.
For the sake of comparison, the relative payoffs are kept the same as in Andersen
et al. (2008), but we divide the payoffs by 10 to remain in the income range over
which we intend to estimate subjects’ risk aversion.
3.2 Identifying time preferences
Our experimental design for eliciting time preferences is based on the multiple price
lists introduced by Coller and Williams (1999). We follow similar time intervals as
in Andersen et al. (2008), to be able to compare the two methodologies. We use four
intertemporal choice tasks by manipulating the time when the rewards are offered to
subjects (t=2 months, 6 months, 1 year and 2 years for option B). Table 2 is an exam-
ple of the payoff table given to the subjects in order to elicit their time preferences.
Subjects are asked to choose between option A and option B. If a subject is indiffer-
ent, she can choose option I, for indifference. Option A offerse300 in one month and
option B offers e(300 + x) six months from now, where x is computed given a dis-
count rate of 5% to 50% on the principal of e300, compounded quarterly. We use a
compounded interest rate to increase ecological validity; in practice, a year or a quar-
ter is the most common compounding period.We use the latter because in the first two
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Table 2 Payoffs table for the 6-month time horizon in the discount rate experiment. Subjects completed
four intertemporal choice tasks, with different time horizons (t=2 months, 6 months, 1 year and 2 years
for option B)
Payment Payment Annual Annual Preferred
Payoff Option A Option B Interest Effective Payment
(amount (e) (amount (e) Rate Interest Rate Option
Alternative to be paid to be paid (AR) (AER) (Choose A,
in 1 month) in 6 months) I or B)
1 300 306.17 5% 5.09% A I B
2 300 312.40 10% 10.38% A I B
3 300 318.68 15% 15.87% A I B
4 300 324.99 20% 21.55% A I B
5 300 331.36 25% 27.44% A I B
6 300 337.78 30% 33.55% A I B
7 300 344.25 35% 39.87% A I B
8 300 350.76 40% 46.41% A I B
9 300 357.32 45% 53.18% A I B
10 300 363.92 50% 60.18% A I B
time discounting tasks, the experimental time frames are less than a year. The elicited
discount rates lie within a specific interval. For instance, for the choices available in
Table 2, if a subject chooses option A in decision row 3 and option B in decision
row 4, her discount rate lies in the interval (15%, 20%). Given that subjects complete
four intertemporal choice tasks, our estimation method can infer stable interest rates
that may lie inside an interval, not only at the interval bounds. We present subjects
with annual and annual effective interest rates,2 to facilitate comparison with other
opportunities for investment present outside the lab and minimize errors in judgment.
We introduce a one-month delay for option A for all tasks to avoid quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997). There is extensive evidence in the economics
and psychology literatures that individuals exhibit a bias for immediate payoffs. Dis-
count rates elicited from choices between a current payoff and a future one are
significantly higher than the discount rates elicited from two future choices. One
explanation for such present biased preferences is a preference for certain outcomes
(Andreoni and Sprenger 2012b). Subjects would disproportionately prefer the cer-
tain present option to the inherently risky future option. Since this present bias is not
the focus of our study, we introduced a front-end delay. In our experiment, subjects
choose between two future payoffs and they are expected to behave as exponential
discounters (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012b). Delaying both options also reduces the
influence of transaction costs on intertemporal choices. If only the delayed option
2These terms are explained in the experimental instructions (see the Online Appendix).
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involved greater transaction costs, the revealed discount rate would include these sub-
jective costs. As both options occur in the future, such transaction costs are equivalent
and will not influence the revealed discount rate.3
3.3 Consistency and validity checks
Our experiment involves hypothetical stakes. The literature presents mixed evidence
on whether individuals respond differently to hypothetical choices involving risk or
time discounting than they do in a real-choice context. Taylor (2013) shows that
on average, measured risk preferences are not significantly different across real and
hypothetical settings. Holt and Laury (2002) demonstrate that individuals appear to
be more tolerant of risk in a hypothetical setting, and that this “hypothetical bias”
increases with the size of the stakes. Camerer (2004) notes that the effect of incen-
tives on behavior is likely to depend on the task. However, the choice over money
gambles is not likely to be a domain in which people would behave according to
expected utility theory if they put more effort into the task. Using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), Kang et al. (2011) show that common areas of the
brain are activated when individuals make real and hypothetical choices about the
purchase of consumer goods, but that the level of this activity differs.
In our experiment, we provided the subjects with a sample task before the exper-
iment to ensure that they understood the instructions clearly (one decision row was
chosen from both time discounting and risk preference tasks). We also performed
a consistency check for the first time discounting and risk aversion tasks (see the
Online Appendix). Few subjects switched between lotteries A and B in either tasks.
Subjects switched back to lottery A after choosing lottery B in only 1.7% of the
risk aversion tasks (6 tasks out of 348 completed) and in 3.7% of the time discount-
ing elicitations (13 tasks out of 348 completed). Furthermore, no subject chose only
option A or only option B throughout the four time discounting or risk aversion tasks,
suggesting that subjects’ risk and time preferences are within the ranges provided in
the experimental design.
To assess the quality of our data, we conducted a within-subject analysis in the four
risk aversion and time discounting tasks. After computing the variance in switching
points, we averaged the standard deviation across subjects. On average, the switching
point between the smaller, sooner and larger, later payoffs varied by 1.66 decision
rows. For the risk preferences task, the switching point varied on average by 1.09
decision rows. The switching point varied significantly more for the discount rate
tasks than for the risk aversion tasks (p < 0.01). This variation is not only due to
response error, but also due to hyperbolic discounting, i.e. subjects tend to be more
patient, thus switch at a lower decision row, as the time interval increases. Even
though most subjects chose to switch from lottery A to lottery B without selecting the
option corresponding to an indifference point (79.04% for risk aversion tasks, 69.5%
for the discounting tasks), the relatively large number of stated indifference points
3We note that the two-month delay for option B in the first intertemporal choice task occurred during the
summer vacation. This could have led to an increase in reported discount rates.
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(20.96% for the risk elicitation task and 30.5% for the discounting task) helped us to
estimate the discount rates and risk aversion coefficients, by improving the precision
of the recovered estimates.
4 Model specification
Our hierarchical Bayes framework provides a natural context in which we jointly
estimate individual level risk and time preferences. We set up 1) a risk preference
specification, 2) a method to jointly measure risk and time preferences, and 3) a
method to capture heterogeneity in individual preferences. We review all the three
components in turn.
4.1 Modeling risk preferences
We do not impose any assumptions about linear risk preferences in income.
Consequently, the utility function is the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
specification (Holt and Laury 2002):
U(M) = (ω + M)
(1−r)
1 − r , f or r = 1 (1)
where M is the monetary amount, ω is the time invariant amount of background
consumption, and r is the CRRA coefficient where r = 0 denotes risk neutral behav-
ior, r > 0 denotes risk aversion and r < 0 denotes risk-seeking behavior. The
background consumption represents estimated daily consumption levels, assumed
constant over the time frame we analyze. Given our CRRA specification and positive
values of background consumption, as opposed to ω=0, observed choices from our
experiment imply higher levels of risk coefficients, thus more curvature of the utility
function. We assume positive levels of background consumption as in Andersen et al.
(2008) and exogenously vary its value to provide a sensitivity analysis of our results
to the level of estimated daily consumption.
To specify the likelihood of the risk aversion responses, we first compute the
expected utility (EU) as the sum of payoffs weighted by the probabilities induced by
the experimenter. Given that there are two outcomes (k=1, 2) in each lottery j, the EU




p(Mk) × U(ω + Mk) (2)
Following Holt and Laury (2002), we implement a simple stochastic specification to
specify the likelihood conditional on the model. The specification is standard in the
decision making literature and has been implemented by Andersen et al. (2008) and
Laury et al. (2012).












where EU is the cumulative probability distribution reflecting differences in the
expected utility of the two lotteries A and B and μ is a behavioral noise parameter.
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When μ → 0, the specification collapses to the deterministic expected utility theory
(EUT), where the alternative with the highest expected utility will be chosen with
certainty. However, when μ → ∞, the choices become random, indifferent to the
expected utilities. Toubia et al. (2013) introduce a similar error specification, where
a noise parameter implies whether choices are random or whether they converge to a
deterministic selection.
The likelihood of the risk aversion responses conditional on EUT and CRRA
specification depends on r and μ. The conditional log-likelihood is:
lnLRA(r, μ, y, ω) =
∑
j





ln(1 − EU)|yj = 0] + [ln(1 − EU)|yj = −1]}(4)
where yj = 1 implies the choice of option B; yj = −1 the choice of option A
and yj = 0 shows indifference between A and B, implying a 50-50 mixture of the
likelihood of choosing either of the lotteries.
4.2 Modeling time preferences
We first consider the mainstream specification of time preferences. Assuming
exponential discounting, a subject is indifferent between two income options if:
U(ω + Mt) + 1
(1 + δ)τ U(ω) = U(ω) +
1
(1 + δ)τ U(ω + Mt+τ ) (5)
where U(ω + Mt) is the utility of monetary outcome Mt for delivery at time t plus
background consumption ω; δ is the discount rate; τ is the delay to the larger, later
reward.
The utility function U(.) is separable and stationary over time. The left-hand side
of Eq. 5 is the sum of the discounted utilities of receiving the monetary outcome Mt
at time t (in addition to background consumption) and receiving nothing extra at time
t+τ , and the right-hand side is the sum of the discounted utilities of receiving nothing
over background consumption at time t and the outcome Mt+τ (plus background
consumption) at time t + τ .
The specification we use for the discount rate is similar to the one employed for
risk aversion. By assuming the CRRA utility function as before, we can write the
discounted utilities of each of the two options as:
PVA = 1
(1 + δ)t U(ω + MA) +
1
(1 + δ)t+τ U(ω) (6)
PVB = 1
(1 + δ)t U(ω) +
1
(1 + δ)t+τ U(ω + MB) (7)
where PVA and PVB are the present values of option A and option B; MA and MB
are the monetary amounts in the discounting tasks presented to subjects, to be paid at
time t and time t + τ respectively.
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The cumulative distribution function for the discount rate task is specified
similarly as for risk aversion.












where PV is the cumulative probability distribution reflecting differences in the
present values of the two tasks, conditional on r, δ and ν. ν is the behavioral noise
parameter, allowing some subjects to make some errors from the perspective of
expected utility theory, similar to the μ noise parameter in the risk aversion task.
Given that the risk aversion task involves choices in lotteries as opposed to values,
we assume that it is cognitively more difficult, therefore expect μ > ν.
The log-likelihood for the time discounting responses, conditional on r, δ and ν,
is:
lnLDR(r, μ, δ, ν, y, ω) =
∑
j





ln(1 − PV )|yj = 0] + [ln(1 − PV )|yj = −1]}
(9)
where yj = -1, 1 and 0 denotes selection of option A, B or indifference in observation
j, respectively.
The joint likelihood of the risk aversion and the discount rate responses can then
be written as:
lnL(r, μ, δ, ν, y, ω) = lnLRA + lnLDR (10)
4.3 The hierarchical Bayes specification: Heterogeneity and priors
The most common approach in estimating decision making models (cumulative
prospect theory, time discounting etc.) is single-subject maximum likelihood estima-
tion (MLE). There are several limitations of using a single-subject MLE methodol-
ogy. First, while the method is efficient when a large number of observations per
subject are available, its main drawback is the assumption that all subjects are inde-
pendent, without considering that individual parameter estimates originate from a
group-level distribution. The hierarchical Bayes estimation simultaneously estimates
the individual level parameters and addresses the above limitation through a compro-
mise between the two extremes of complete independence and pooling (average-level
parameter estimates where all subjects are presumed to be identical). The method
shrinks the individual estimates towards the group mean, and this effect is more
pronounced when the individual estimates are less reliable.
Second, the single-subject MLE provides point estimates for the model param-
eters. Using these point estimates in analyses of variance or regressions, without
factoring in their reliabilities, could lead to poor predictions, as results can be severely
influenced by extreme observations. Through the above mentioned shrinkage effect,
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the hierarchical Bayes estimation provides a way to directly quantify the uncer-
tainty on the parameters. Thus, it prevents unreliable information from having a
disproportionate influence on the parameter estimates.
A random effects approach (or an error components approach—formally equiv-
alent) allows for correlation in unobserved utility over several choices for each
respondent, and overcomes the assumption of complete independence. Since such a
model usually involves high-dimensional integrals that are analytically intractable,
the random effects model is estimated via maximum simulated likelihood (MSLE),
or Bayesian methods. In addition to the simulation step necessary to integrate over
all values of the model parameters for each individual, MSLE also involves an opti-
mization step, leaving it vulnerable to issues such as reach of global maxima vs. local
maxima, and requires a tolerance level and proper starting values. Bayesian inference
is a simulation technique that can overcome such problems, because it covers the
parameter space more effectively (see Jackman 2009 for proofs involving hierarchi-
cal specifications). The quantities of interest in Bayesian inferences are the posterior
distributions of the model parameters, and the method provides an exact estimation
of these distributions, in small as well as in large samples (Rossi and Allenby 2003).
MSLE provides an approximation of these distributions, and needs large samples for
asymptotic properties of convergence. Relevant for our setting, the Bayesian infer-
ence is more suited than MSLE to ensure that all parameters have the same sign or
are bounded within a certain range for all subjects. The Bayesian procedure handles
transformations of the model parameters more efficiently (e.g., exponential transfor-
mation for log-normally distributed parameters), as it does not search for a maximum.
The method is particularly suited in situations where only a limited amount of data
per subject are available for a moderately large sample of subjects, typical for exper-
iments in decision making. It provides reliable estimates even with a small amount
of data per individual (Rossi and Allenby 2003).
Using Bayes’ theorem, we combine the likelihood function in Eq. 10 with prior
distributions to obtain posterior distributions for our model parameters. The two
building blocks of our Bayesian framework are related to the specification of hetero-
geneity and the introduction of prior distributions of the parameters. We introduce
each of the aspects in turn.
We estimate individual level parameters by leveraging the information on the dis-
tribution of parameters across subjects in our experiment. We specify the following
heterogeneity model:
θi = θ0 + ui; ui ∼ N(0, Vθ ) (11)
where θi is the vector of individual level risk and time coefficients (ri , δi , μi, νi). θ0
represents a vector of average risk and time preferences and related noise parameters.
The unexplained heterogeneity, ui , is normally distributed. Vθ shows the variance of
the model parameters and the covariances between them. This matrix, along with the
correlation between the individual level risk and time estimates, allows us to assess
the link between subjects’ risk attitudes and intertemporal choices.
Our model is a hierarchical Bayes model because we formulate prior distributions
not only on the parameters that specify the likelihood function, but also on those
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priors themselves. We set up a two-stage model that allows the first-stage priors to
be influenced by the data. The prior on θi , usually referred to as a first-stage prior,
follows a normal distribution:
First-stage prior
θi ∼ N(θ0, Vθ )
To ensure the parameters remain in an acceptable range, i.e., δi, μi, νi are positive-
definite, we apply an exponential transformation to the parameter estimates. We also
set priors on the parameters in the heterogeneity model, called second-stage priors.
Second-stage prior
vec(θ0|Vθ) ∼ N(θ0, A−1 ⊗ Vθ)
Vθ ∼ IW(ν, V0)
The second-stage priors would allow us to incorporate any information that we
might have before our data collection. These priors are usually chosen to be as unin-
formative as possible, to allow the data to determine the values of the parameter
estimates. All the above specifications are standard in the hierarchical Bayes litera-
ture (Rossi et al. 2005). The prior distributions for θ0 and Vθ are a normal distribution
and an Inverse Wishart distribution, respectively. The latter is chosen because it is
a conjugate prior to the likelihood implied by the first-stage prior, thus the poste-
rior distribution of Vθ is also Inverse Wishart. We obtain the posterior distribution
of the model parameters by combining the likelihood in Eq. 10 with the first and
second-stage priors:
p({θi}, θ0, Vθ |Data) ∝ p(Data|{θi}) × p({θi}|θ0, Vθ )
× p({θ0}|θ0, A−1) × p(Vθ |ν, V0) (12)
where p(Data|{θi}) is given by the likelihood in Eq. 10, p({θi}|θ0, Vθ ) is the first-
stage prior, p({θ0}|θ0, A−1) and p(Vθ |ν, V0) are the second-stage priors. The value
of hierarchical Bayes lies in estimating the parameters for all individuals simulta-
neously, as opposed to traditional methods, which estimate the parameters of each
decision maker independently. The model estimates parameters for each individual,
but restricts these parameters through the group distribution. This constraint allows
for the potentially unreliable information from one participant to be weighted against
the information from all other individuals, and prevents overfitting.
We make inferences about all model parameters based on posterior distributions
obtained through Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We use the point
estimates of risk and time parameters for each subject in our experiment, drawn from
the posterior distribution, to characterize the extent of heterogeneity.4
4Additional details on data preparation, model estimation, and the code are available upon request.
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4.4 Alternative specifications
We test the exponential discounting model against alternative specifications. We first
implement Mazur’s (1987) hyperbolic specification and replace Eqs. 6 and 7 with:
PVA = 1
(1 + γ t)U(ω + MA) +
1




(1 + γ t)U(ω) +
1
(1 + γ (t + τ))U(ω + MB) (7
′)
where γ > 0 is the discount rate.
We also evaluate the effect of using a more general hyperbolic specification
proposed by Prelec (2004). This specification replaces Eqs. 6 and 7 with:
PVA = exp(−βtα)U(ω + MA) + exp(−β(t + τ)α)U(ω) (6′′)
and
PVB = exp(−βtα)U(ω) + exp(−β(t + τ)α)U(ω + MB) (7′′)
where α exhibits decreasing impatience, i.e., lower discount rates over time. When
α = 1, the specification collapses to the exponential discounting model. β char-
acterizes time preferences in the conventional sense. It represents the instantaneous
discount rate when α = 1. When α < 1, the instantaneous discount rate is given by
αβtα−1.
We also consider a mix of populations behaving differently for choice under risk
and over time (Conte et al. 2011; Andersen et al. 2008). From a discounting theory
perspective, this implies that a proportion of the population discounts exponentially,
while the rest are hyperbolic discounters. We consider the sensitivity of our results
to a statistical specification allowing more than one latent process to generate each
observation. Following Andersen et al. (2008), we introduce a finite mixture model of
exponential and hyperbolic models of discounting. The mixture likelihood function
is given by:
lnL(r, μ, δ, ν, y, ω) = lnLRA + πlnLDR−E + (1 − π)lnLDR−H (10′)
where π is the probability that a given observation is generated by the exponen-
tial discounting model, such that 0 ≤ π ≤ 1. lnLDR−E represents exponential
discounting and lnLDR−H represents Mazur’s or Prelec’s hyperbolic discounting.
5 Experimental results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
We estimate individual level risk and time preferences using data from our experi-
ment. For the estimation, we set the background consumption equal to ω = 12 in
J Risk Uncertain (2016) 53:1–28 15
order to compare our results with previous literature (Andersen et al. 2008). Table 3
presents the descriptive statistics for the risk aversion and discounting experimen-
tal tasks. The risk aversion measure shows the average decision row where subjects
switched from option A to option B. On average, subjects chose the “safe” lottery A
for six rows. A risk neutral subject would choose Lottery A for the first four decision
rows and then switch to Lottery B. Thus our average subject is moderately risk-
averse. The average discount rate is about 26%. The Pearson correlation between
risk aversion (the average decision row where subjects switch in the four experimen-
tal tasks) and the model-free discount rate is 0.14, not significantly different from 0
(p = 0.17).
Figure 1 displays the proportion of subjects selecting the sooner option (pay-
ment in one month) in each of the decision rows, for the four discounting
tasks. Starting in decision row 3, a higher proportion of subjects choose the
sooner option A over the later option B in the two-month delay task than in the
two-year delay task. This implies that subjects are most impatient in the two-
month delay task and least impatient in the two-year delay task. This is in line
with previous literature and provides some model-free evidence of hyperbolic
discounting.
5.2 Estimation results
We estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters based on a total of 10,000
MCMC draws, and assess convergence visually by inspecting the MCMC trace plot
of the log-likelihood. The MCMC chain converged after 5,000 iterations, thus we
discard the first 5,000 draws. Table 4 summarizes the posterior distributions of the
risk and time parameters across individuals.
We use the log Bayes Factor (logBF) to compare models. This measure accounts
for model fit and prevents overfitting (Kass and Raftery 1995). The measure
integrates over the set of parameters in each model. Therefore, Bayes factors auto-
matically penalize models with too much complexity (too many parameters). Table 4
shows all the model comparisons necessary to determine which data generating pro-
cess fits the data better, i.e. exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting or a
mixture model. The logBF is the difference between the log-marginal likelihood
(LML) of model 2 (M2) and model 1 (M1). We use the Newton Raftery estima-
tor to estimate the log marginal likelihood (i.e. the harmonic mean of log-likelihood
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the risk measures and the discount rates (n=87)
Min Max Average Std. Deviation
Discount Rate 0 50 25.91 13.52
Risk Aversion 2.25 9 5.68 1.61
Age 20 37 23.89 3.41
Gender 41 men 46 women – –
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draws after the burn-in period). Kass and Raftery (1995) suggest that a value of
logBF=LML of M2 - LML of M1 higher than 5 provides evidence of the superior-
ity of model 2. Here, we benchmark all models against the exponential discounting
model (M1).
5.2.1 Model comparison
The comparative results suggest that the model that best fits the data is Prelec’s
hyperbolic model. The value of the α parameter is significantly lower than 1 (α
= 0.748, s.e. = 0.072), suggesting that participants discount more heavily rewards
received in the near future. Figure 2 compares the instantaneous discount rates for the
hyperbolic and exponential models, assuming risk aversion and risk neutrality. Both
the exponential and Prelec’s hyperbolic model show the same basic results regard-
ing elicited discount rates. Failing to correct for the curvature of the utility function
when eliciting time preferences results in overestimating discount rates. We use both
Mazur’s hyperbolic and Prelec’s hyperbolic model to investigate a mixture specifi-
cation of exponential and hyperbolic discounting. Both specifications reveal similar
results. About 60% of the subjects discount future rewards hyperbolically, while the
remaining 40% discount exponentially, showing that individuals have heterogeneous
underlying discounting patterns. Given the widespread usage of exponential dis-
counting and for the sake of comparison with results from earlier studies, we provide












































Fig. 1 Proportion of participants choosing the sooner option (option A) by decision row in the four
discounting tasks
J Risk Uncertain (2016) 53:1–28 17
5.2.2 Time preferences
Our results suggest that, on average, individuals demand relatively high interest rates
to delay consumption, and are moderately risk-averse. As depicted in Table 4, the
discount rate parameter has a posterior mean of 12.05% with the 95% credible inter-
val at (9.93%, 14.49%); the average constant relative risk aversion is 0.515, with the
95% credible interval at (0.418, 0.614). Assuming risk neutrality (the constant rela-
tive risk aversion coefficient is set to 0), the discount rate is estimated at 22.79% with
a 95% credible interval at (19.19%, 26.84%). The average discount rates after cor-
recting for the curvature of the utility function are in line and strengthen the results
from the literature on joint elicitation of risk and time preferences (Andersen et al.
2008; Andreoni and Sprenger 2012a). Moreover, our estimated discount rates are
much lower than what was previously reported in the intertemporal choice literature,
where discount rates of the order of hundreds are not uncommon (Loewenstein and
Prelec 1992; Frederick et al. 2002). Given our sample of financially educated busi-
ness school students, we might expect discount rates to be lower than in other studies.
Our estimated discount rates are indeed below the level reported in Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a), who used a freshman and sophomore sample in their study. The
Table 4 Parameter estimates: means and standard deviations (below) of the posterior distributions (n=87)
Model Risk Noise Discount Noise Mixture logBF3
Aversion Parameter Rate Parameter Parameter
μ ν π (LML)
Exponential 0.5151a 0.041a 0.120a 0.011a −
(0.05) (0.004) (0.011) (0.001) (−2,010)
Mazur’s 0.507a 0.043a 0.126a 0.009a 39
hyperbolic (0.051) (0.004) (0.012) (0.001) (−1,971)
Prelec’s 0.514a 0.041a 0.131, 0.748a 0.008a 210
hyperbolic (0.052) (0.004) (0.015, 0.072) (0.001) (−1,800)
(β, α)
Exponential/ 0.41a 0.040a 0.113 0.008 0.41062 136




1Statistical signif. codes:(a) 99% interval does not include 0
2The mixture parameter π is not statistically different than 50%
3Last column reports the log-Bayes factors and log-marginal likelihoods (in brackets)
The logBF is the difference between the log-marginal likelihood of the specified model minus the
log-marginal likelihood of the exponential discounting model. A value higher than 5 suggests that
the specified model fits the data better
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results are in line with Laury et al. (2012) findings, estimated with an undergradu-
ate student sample from a large US university. Also, our results show slightly higher
discount rates than reported in Andersen et al. (2008), which used a representative
sample of the adult Danish population.
5.2.3 Risk preferences
Our utility curvature estimates are lower than those reported in Andersen et al.
(2008) (average CRRA estimate of 0.515; s.e. = 0.050 versus 0.741; s.e. = 0.048).
In turn, our results imply a higher level of risk aversion than those reported by
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), who find that aggregate utility curvature is far closer
to linear utility than estimated from the double mutiple-price list approach used in
Andersen et al. (2008). Interestingly, they find no correlation between the risk esti-
mates from the multiple price list approach and the convex time budget approach,
despite the fact that under CRRA utility, the two elicitation methods measure the
same utility construct. This suggests that further research is necessary to assess
which methodology is more suited to assess curvature in discounting models. The
noise parameters, showing the extent to which subjects’ choices are due to deci-
sion errors or randomness, are also within expected ranges (Holt and Laury 2002;
Andersen et al. 2008). The fact that the noise parameter estimate is smaller for the
time discounting task than for the risk aversion task (0.041; s.e. = 0.004 for risk





















































Fig. 2 Estimated instantaneous discount rate for hyperbolic discounters vs. exponential discounters,
assuming risk aversion (left) and risk neutrality (right)
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time discounting elicitation procedure is cognitively easier than the risk preference
task.
5.3 Heterogeneity in risk and time preferences
5.3.1 Investigating possible drivers of heterogeneity—observable characteristics
The heterogeneity model presented in Section 4.3 is a special case of a hierarchical
Bayes random effects model, in which the distribution of heterogeneity is recov-
ered and described, but the heterogeneity in preferences is not explained by observed
variables. We extend this model and attempt to partly explain heterogeneity in risk
and time preferences using the subjects’ individual differences. We collected data on
gender, age, and grade in the introductory finance course if they had attended one
(84/87 or 96.5% of the sample). We conduct our analysis based on the exponential
discounting model. Equation 11 is replaced with:
θi = zi + ui; ui ∼ N(0, Vθ ) (11′)
where zi is a set of individual difference variables for individual i, and  captures
the impact of covariates on subjects’ risk and time preferences. The first and second-
stage priors will also reflect the changes in our model.
First-stage prior
θi ∼ N(zi, Vθ )
Second-stage prior
vec(|Vθ ) ∼ N(,A−1 ⊗ Vθ)
Vθ ∼ IW(ν, V0)
Table 5 Parameter estimates for the observed heterogeneity model, showing the impact of the individual
difference variables on risk and time preferences: means and standard deviations (below) of the posterior
distributions (n=87)
Model Risk Noise Discount Noise
Parameters Aversion Parameter μ Rate Parameter ν
Intercept 0.4871a 0.049a 0.123a 0.012a
0.046 0.004 0.012 0.001
Age 0.002 −0.002 −0.065a −0.044
0.014 0.028 0.028 0.028
Gender 0.180c −0.110 −0.096 −0.448
0.098 0.180 0.177 0.186
Finance Grade −0.002 −0.031 0.035 0.065
0.021 0.03f9 0.039 0.041
1Statistical signif. codes: (a) 99% interval does not include 0. (c) 90% interval does not include 0
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We estimated the model following the methodology outlined in Section 4. We mean-
centered the demographic variables to be able to interpret the intercept as the average
parameters.
The explained heterogeneity model converged to a log-marginal likelihood of
−2, 098. The logBF between the explained heterogeneity and the unexplained het-
erogeneity model is 88. Therefore, we find strong evidence that the unexplained
heterogeneity model is more parsimonious and seems to fit the data better, as our
individual difference variables do not seem to explain well the variance in sub-
jects’ risk attitudes and intertemporal choices. In line with previous literature, we
find no significant effect of gender on intertemporal choices (Chesson and Viscusi
2000). Table 5 reports two significant effects. Gender positively impacts risk aversion
(λr−gender = 0.180; s.e. = 0.098). Women appear to be more risk-averse, which val-
idates previous findings (Eckel and Grossman 2008; Ioannou and Sadeh 2016). The
expected discount rate decreases with age (λδ−age = −0.065; s.e. = 0.028). This
contradicts previous research showing that older individuals require higher discount
rates as they tend to be more concerned about receiving the payoffs within their life-
time (Chesson and Viscusi 2000). Our results could be due to the limited age range in
our sample. The minimum age is 20 and maximum age is 37, with a mean at 23.89.
5.3.2 Discrete heterogeneity—Cluster analysis
To explore the extent of heterogeneity in risk attitudes and intertemporal choices in
the sample, we use K-means clustering and group the decision makers in our sample
based on the individual level CRRA estimates and discount rates. After eliminating
the outliers from this analysis (two subjects with discount rates higher than 50%), we
identify three types of decision makers, as shown in Fig. 3. Even though the scree
plot does not give a clear picture with respect to the number of clusters to analyze









































Fig. 3 Three-cluster model and scree plot
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(either 3, 4, or 5 types are acceptable), the ease of interpretation for three groups
outweighs the gains in variance explained (7%) from the 4-cluster model over the
3-cluster model. Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of the three groups.
Group 1 (n=14) consists of risk-seeking participants (mean CRRA is -0.10) who
are impatient and require a high discount rate (19.49% on average) to postpone con-
sumption. We call this group the “low patience” type. The second group (n=28)
includes moderately risk-averse subjects (mean CRRA is 0.42), who require a mean
interest rate of 16.94% to postpone consumption. This group represents individuals
with average patterns of behavior on both risk and time dimensions. We label this
group the “moderate patience” type. The third group (n=43) embodies very risk-
averse (mean CRRA is 0.79) individuals who require a low discount rate to postpone
consumption (10.75% on average). We name this group the “high patience” type.
5.3.3 Cumulative discount rate distributions
To further explore heterogeneity, we investigate the cumulative discount rate distri-
bution for each level of risk decision makers are willing to accept. The cumulative
discount rate distribution refers to the percentage of participants who are willing to
accept a discount rate lower than or equal to a specific value. Given that they belong
to clusters 1, 2, and 3, respectively, we know that decision makers are risk-seeking,
risk neutral, and risk-averse and use this information to produce cumulative discount
rate distributions for each cluster of participants.
From Fig. 4 and Table 7, we can determine that about 28% of the risk-seeking
decision makers accept a discount rate less than or equal to 15%. Sixty-four percent
of the risk neutral individuals will accept a discount rate of 20% or less, while only
35% of the risk-seeking individuals will accept such a discount rate. Forty-six percent
of the risk-seeking people will only accept a discount rate of 25% or more, i.e. they
would reject discount rates below 25%. However, 74% of the risk neutral and 64% of
the risk-averse decision makers will accept at least a 20% discount rate, therefore they
accept offers between 20% and 25%, otherwise rejected by risk-seeking participants,
showing that they would be more patient. Risk-seeking individuals will reject plans
or policy measures that are attractive to decision makers belonging to a different type.
In this context, identifying decision makers’ risk preferences and adapting to their
needs becomes important to ensure a wide acceptance of policy measures involving
intertemporal choices.
Table 6 Cluster analysis
Groups
Low Patience Moderate Patience High Patience
CRRA −0.1 0.42 0.79
Discount Rate 19.49% 16.94% 10.75%
Group Size (%) 16% 35% 49%
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Fig. 4 Cumulative distribution of discount rates for different types
5.4 Assessing the correlation between risk and time preferences
The hierarchical Bayes specification allows for a direct measure of the correlation
between risk and time preferences, which is not possible in maximum likelihood
methods. Table 8 reports the covariance matrix Vθ that characterizes the unexplained
variability in risk and time preferences across subjects. The diagonal elements, show-
ing posterior variances of our model parameters, are higher and show significant
heterogeneity between subjects for both risk and intertemporal choices. Therefore,
Table 7 Cumulative distribution of discount rates for different types
Risk-seeking Risk-neutral Risk-averse
accept 15% or less 28.57% 53.57% 74.41%
accept 20% or less 35.71% 64.28% 95.34%
accept 25% or less 64.28% 78.57% 97.67%
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there is scope for analyzing such heterogeneity via individual demographic and psy-
chographic variables. The off-diagonal elements indicate similar patterns of behavior
across subjects. Although the values are based on the exponentially transformed
variables and the size of the covariance is not readily interpretable, the fact that
the covariance is significant and negative supports the finding that more risk-averse
individuals exhibit increasing patience. The propensity for errors is lower for more
risk-averse individuals, since the covariance between the risk aversion parameter r
and the noise parameters ν and μ is significant and negative. The propensity for error
is higher for more impatient individuals (cov(ν, δ)=0.425).
We use the MCMC draws to compute the parameters’ posterior means for each
subject in our sample, based on the exponential discounting model. The correlation
of these predicted values is −0.42 (p < 0.01). Therefore, we find evidence of a
negative correlation between risk aversion and impatience.
We also estimate the discount rates under the assumption that subjects are risk
neutral, and separately estimate individual level risk preferences. The correlation
between discount rates under risk neutrality and CRRA coefficients is 0.16, not sig-
nificant (p > 0.05). This correlation is similar in sign and size with the correlation
between the model free discount rates and risk attitudes.
To assess whether the pattern of correlation differs between risk-seeking, risk neu-
tral and risk-averse individuals, we conduct three regression analyses, each using a
dataset corresponding to the types reported in Section 5.2.3. We find no significant
correlation between risk and time preferences for risk-averse and risk neutral indi-
viduals (Pearson’s r = −0.219, p > 0.05, and Pearson’s r = −0.217, p > 0.05), and
a significant negative correlation between risk and time preferences for risk-seeking
decision makers (Pearson’s r= −0.545, p= 0.044). This shows that the model is able
to recover various patterns of correlation in the data. Moreover, it is crucial to cor-
rect for the concavity of the utility function before assessing the size and sign of this
correlation. We use the risk preferences task to identify the curvature of the utility
Table 8 Covariance matrix of model parameters
Risk Noise Discount Noise
Aversion r Parameter μ Rate δ Parameter ν
Risk 0.2041a −0.159a −0.112a −0.242a
Aversion r (0.032) (0.047) (0.044) (0.063)
Noise 0.560a 0.268a 0.386a
Parameter μ (0.117) (0.084) (0.120)
Discount 0.703a 0.425a
Rate δ (0.121) (0.124)
Noise 1.171a
Parameter ν (0.206)
1Statistical signif. codes:(a) 99% interval does not include 0
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function. At the individual level, we obtain lower discount rates under the assumption
of risk aversion than for risk neutrality. However, this individual-level relationship
does not impact the correlation between risk and time preferences across subjects
(Andersen et al. 2008, page 612).5
5.5 Sensitivity to background consumption
Our estimation technique requires an estimate of the background consumption ω
to control for the curvature of the utility function, as discussed in Section 4.1.
We exogenously set this parameter for the above estimation at ω=12, for comparison
with Andersen et al.’s (2008) study. To assess the sensitivity of our results to differ-
ent levels of background consumption, we vary the value of ω (see Fig. 5). Andersen
et al. (2008) find that their estimated discount rates are not very sensitive to the
level of background consumption, while the CRRA coefficient increases from 0.67
when ω=50 to 0.82 when ω=200. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) report that esti-
mated discount rates double when daily consumption is varied from $3.52 to $14.09.
Although their methodology to elicit curvature-controlled discount rates is invariant
to the level of daily background consumption, when replicating the Andersen et al.
(2008) joint estimation technique, Laury et al. (2012) find that discount rates increase
from a low of 14.3% when ω=0 to about 20% as ω increases. We find that our esti-
mates of risk and time preferences show little sensitivity to background consumption;
the CRRA coefficient increases from 0.49 when ω=1 to 0.57 when ω=200. The dis-
count rates increase from a low of 10.3% for ω=1 to 15.6% for ω=200, similar to
the pattern reported in Laury et al. (2012). Hence, there is a slight increase in the
discount rate when we increase background consumption.
6 Discussion and conclusions
The elicitation of risk and time preferences is pivotal in understanding individu-
als’ decisions such as health-related choices (e.g., dieting, addictions), as well as in
developing efficient public policies that impact private decisions, involving tradeoffs
between now and the future (e.g. environmental policies, incentives for education).
In this paper, we present a method to simultaneously elicit and estimate decision
makers’ risk attitudes and intertemporal choices. We jointly elicit risk and time pref-
erences, as doing so provides significantly lower discount rates than in experiments
which assume subjects to be risk neutral, and closer to what is a priori consid-
ered to be reasonable discount rates. We use a novel individual level estimation
procedure based on a hierarchical Bayes methodology, which embeds standard dis-
counting functions and risk specifications from the decision making literature. The
5To check whether the negative correlation is driven by our choice of model, we conducted a simulation
study to gauge whether we can assess different patterns of correlation. We simulate data from the model,
imposing positive, negative, or no correlation between risk and time preferences. We recover all patterns of
correlation (simulated correlation = {0.38, −0.03, −0.38} vs. estimated correlation = {0.40, 0.09, −0.21},
respectively). We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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Fig. 5 Estimated discount rates and CRRA coefficients as a function of daily background consumption
method accounts for similarities among individuals and provides robust estimates
of the model parameters without ignoring the interdependency between subjects or
over-weighting their individual differences. We achieve this by pulling individual
estimates towards a group mean. This effect is more pronounced when estimates are
less reliable, mitigating the noise in the estimation. Hierarchical Bayes modeling is
particularly useful when the number of subjects in an experiment is relatively large,
while the data from each subject are few or noisy, which is the case in many deci-
sion making experiments including ours. The methodology allows us to obtain more
accurate estimates, without increasing the duration of the experiment or the number
of tasks.
Using our hierarchical Bayes methodology to jointly estimate risk and time prefer-
ences, we recover the probability distributions for the group-level CRRA coefficients
and discount rates, as well as individual level risk attitudes and intertemporal choices.
We find that, on average, individuals require an annual discount rate of 12% to post-
pone consumption and are moderately risk-averse (the constant relative risk aversion
coefficient is 0.515). The results are in line with previous literature on risk and time
preferences and further support the need to control for the curvature of the utility
function when estimating discount rates in experiments. We also test the robustness of
our results against alternative specifications for time preferences, e.g. Mazur’s hyper-
bolic and Prelec’s hyperbolic discounting models, as well as a mixture specification.
The models are easily integrated within our joint estimation of risk and time pref-
erences, another advantage of the hierarchical Bayes methodology. While Prelec’s
hyperbolic specification fits the data better, the qualitative results are similar to those
implied by exponential discounting. This implies that correcting for the curvature of
the utility function is important in estimating discount rates.
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We use the individual level parameter estimates to assess the level of heterogene-
ity in risk and time preferences. We find that women tend to be more risk-averse, and
people tend to be more patient with age. We conduct a cluster analysis and find three
types of decision makers that vary in terms of their risk attitudes and intertempo-
ral choices. Risk-averse individuals are more patient, while risk-seeking individuals
tend to be more impatient. This is a consequence of the reported negative correla-
tion between risk attitudes and intertemporal choices. The results of the model also
suggest that there is significant unobserved heterogeneity, worth assessing in future
studies. Policy makers can use data on preference elicitation to offer type-specific
plans or design mechanisms that produce desirable self-selection, for public policies
involving health issues (e.g., smoking, dieting), education requirements, or environ-
mental plans. An interesting avenue for further research would be to investigate the
most suitable ways to present information on public policy measures to different
types of decision makers.
Reassuring for environmental policy makers, Ioannou and Sadeh (2016) find that
discounting is similar for monetary and environmental decisions. Using an experi-
mental design where subjects make choices between monetary rewards vs. planting
bee-friendly plants, the authors show that while discount rates are not statistically sig-
nificantly different, people tend to be more risk-averse for environmental decisions.
Ioannou and Sadeh’s (2016) study sequentially elicits risk and time preferences and
reports no correlation between subjects’ discount rates and risk aversion, a result we
also confirm when eliciting risk and time preferences sequentially. Their study dif-
fers from ours in a few important respects. We correct for the concavity of the utility
function when eliciting discount rates, and use a hierarchical Bayes methodology to
simultaneously estimate risk and time preferences. Also, Ioannou and Sadeh’s (2016)
study involves real stakes, while we use hypothetical stakes. More research is nec-
essary to assess the correlation between risk and time preferences across different
domains, elicitation protocols and estimation methods.
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